Is Trump's ceasefire a trick for escalation? A pessimist's view

Whether by design or indecision, Donald Trump continues to keep the world guessing. Even after the Pakistani-brokered, fragile two-week ceasefire, odds are split on whether he sticks to diplomacy or is simply using negotiations as a smokescreen to transition the war into a new phase.

The precedent for deceiving Tehran via negotiations remains fresh, bitter, and instructive. Based on his track record, "guessing" Trump’s intent becomes less difficult: war is the destination; diplomacy is the cover.

In June of last year, Trump attacked Iran, jointly with Israel, in the midst of a flurry of statements promising that talks in Muscat were about to conclude a deal between the US and Iran. He repeated the pattern this past February, engaging in fruitless negotiation while preparing for an attack. On both occasions, he successfully diverted global attention toward diplomacy while military strikes were being decisively prepared and executed. Therefore, the continuation of the war is still highly likely, for the current back-and-forth could only be part of a third act of deception.

By saturating the airwaves with diplomatic rhetoric, Trump can eventually claim that all avenues for de-escalation have been exhausted. The "fifteen points" documents offered to Tehran as a baseline for talks, described by Iranians as "extremely maximalist," reads like a demand for total surrender. It is a document engineered for rejection.

By placing the onus on Tehran, the US portrays Iranian leadership as the sole obstacle to peace. Meanwhile, the military buildup accelerates across multiple fronts. American troops and warships are flooding the region daily, and plans to occupy strategic Iranian islands are now a matter of public discourse.

Amassing tens of thousands of troops takes weeks, and long, fruitless rounds of "talks about talks" provide the perfect camouflage for the mobilisation required for the next phase of the war. The bought time and rhetoric about the ceasefire calm gas and oil prices and salvage stock markets – Trump’s other battlefield, to which he directs his statements as well.

In parallel to military buildup, a coalition of dozens of states has nominally assembled under the banner of reopening and securing the Strait of Hormuz. This group includes key players, such as the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the UAE, whose economies have been battered by the Strait's closure.

While this collective endeavour is presented as an independent mission, distinct from the broader American-Israeli military campaign, the reality could likely be more cynical. By focusing solely on the strategic passage, the coalition functions as a "second tier" of the conflict. As the timeline of the war drags on, this international fleet is positioned to converge with the grander strategy, effectively globalising a regional war.

Copying the ‘Iraqi model’?

A retrospective of the 2003 invasion of Iraq offers a chilling blueprint for the current crisis. In the run-up to the war, Washington bypassed direct bilateral talks with Baghdad at the time, yet imposed its will through the UN Security Council. For months, Iraqi negotiators in New York engaged with UNSC teams that served as little more than conduits for US demands.

Simultaneously, the US executed a massive military buildup, deploying tens of thousands of troops equipped with cutting-edge strike technology. Optimists at the time wishfully interpreted this mobilisation as a "yardstick" intended to compel Iraqi disarmament through sheer pressure. Realistically, however, the invasion was already a certainty; the negotiations were never an alternative to war, but a fundamental part of the scheme to launch it.

Then, Israeli influence and pressure were largely exerted behind the scenes. As documented by credible academics and writers, the Israeli lobby in Washington was a primary driver of that conflict.

In the current war, however, Israel is not merely a driving force; it is at the forefront. Ending this war requires satisfying two distinct sets of objectives. For the US, goals have remained vague and shifting, often tethered to Trump’s latest rhetoric. Nominally, these revolve around neutralising Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Ironically, opening the Hormuz Straits has been added as a new objective; a waterway that had already been open and smoothly functioning before the war.

For Israel and its close allies in Washington, the objectives are far broader: the total destruction of Iran’s nuclear and conventional military assets, and the destruction of the Iranian regime itself.

Achieving these maximalist goals through diplomacy is simply impossible. For Israel, the post-2003 Iraqi scenario, of total collapse and internal splits, is the ideal outcome: one that can only be reached through continued war and ground engagement.

The current war represents a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for Israel to realise a generational strategic goal. By pushing for deeper American entanglement, Israel ensures that the US cannot easily disengage until a total "victory" is achieved. The hawkish consensus shared by Israel and Trump’s inner circle envisions the total fragmentation of the Iranian state, a process designed to permanently remove Iran from the "threat list," mirroring the fate of Iraq in 2003.

Despite the current buzz about a temporary ceasefire, it is difficult to imagine this "mad war" ending halfway. The momentum behind its continuation until the so-called total victory far outweighs the scattered calls for an immediate ceasefire. This includes Iran’s strategy of attacking neighbouring Gulf states.

Leveraging global pressure through oil and gas disruptions has backfired, yielding more regional enemies than political leverage. Whether reports of Saudi and Emirati requests for Trump to "finish the job" are accurate or not, the sentiment across Gulf governments has shifted. They are increasingly receptive to a prolonged campaign that ends future Iranian threats to their countries.

This evolution bolsters Trump’s narrative that he is fighting a defensive war for the entire region, rather than merely shielding Israeli interests. However, as the conflict drags on and the human and economic costs mount, the possibility of a middle-ground resolution through negotiation vanishes. In this climate, a diplomatic exit is no longer just unlikely; it is being systematically engineered out of existence.

Khaled Al Hroub is Palestinian academic and author of Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, and Hamas: Political Thought and Practice.

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