Strip JavaScript, OpenAction, Launch actions and other active content from PDFs. Lightweight Python library on top of pikepdf. MIT licensed.

📚 Full documentation | 📦 PyPI | 🛠️ Built by kovetz.co.il

PDFs can carry executable content: JavaScript that runs when the file opens, auto-actions that fire on every page navigation, "Launch" actions that try to open other programs, embedded files that drop malware. If you process user-uploaded PDFs in your app, you should strip this content before serving them back.

The Python ecosystem has parsers (pikepdf, pypdf, PyMuPDF) and a heavy container-based tool (Dangerzone), but no clean drop-in library that says "give me this PDF without active content." This is that library.

Be precise about the threat model before you rely on this.

In scope. Content the PDF asks a viewer to execute: document and annotation JavaScript, /OpenAction and /AA auto-actions, /Launch and the other dangerous action types, embedded files, XFA, and URI actions pointing at javascript:, file:, data: and friends. This is a real and actively exploited class — removing it is worth doing, and it costs you a few milliseconds per file.

Out of scope. Memory-corruption bugs in the viewer's parser — the heap overflows and use-after-frees that turn up in PDFium and Acrobat several times a year. Those fire on malformed structure, with no active content involved at all. Stripping actions does nothing to them, and neither does any other structural sanitizer.

If that is your threat model — hostile documents from untrusted senders, journalists, incident response — you want render-to-pixels reconstruction inside a disposable sandbox, i.e. Dangerzone. Not this. A library installed into your own process inevitably parses the hostile file in your process; the isolation is the protection, and a library cannot ship isolation.

This library is a cheap, high-value layer for a normal web app that accepts PDF uploads and serves them back. It is one layer, not a guarantee. Run it behind an antivirus pass on the original upload, and keep your viewers patched.

pip install pdf-defang

Requires Python 3.9+ and pikepdf 8+.

from pdf_defang import sanitize, scan

# Clean a file in place
sanitize("uploaded.pdf")

# Get a detailed report of what was removed
report = sanitize("uploaded.pdf", return_report=True)
print(report.javascript_in_names)        # 2
print(report.open_action_removed)        # True
print(report.annotation_action_types)    # ['Launch']
print(report.dangerous_uris_removed)     # 1
print(report.as_dict())                  # JSON-serialisable

# Inspect a file WITHOUT modifying it
report = scan("suspicious.pdf")
print(report.risk_level)                 # 'high' / 'medium' / 'low' / 'none'
print(report.has_javascript)             # True

from pdf_defang import sanitize_async, scan_async

async def handle_upload(path):
    report = await sanitize_async(path, return_report=True)
    return report.as_dict()

from pdf_defang import SanitizeError, sanitize_bytes

raw_pdf: bytes = ...   # from S3, HTTP, anywhere
try:
    cleaned: bytes = sanitize_bytes(raw_pdf)
except SanitizeError as exc:
    # Unparseable or encrypted - nothing was stripped, so there is no
    # clean file to serve. Reject it.
    ...
# No disk involved

sanitize("encrypted.pdf", password="hunter2")
# Still encrypted with the same password, JavaScript removed.

# Public uploads: kill everything active (safest)
sanitize("untrusted.pdf")                            # level="strict"

# Trusted internal forms that need Submit / Calculate buttons:
sanitize("expense_form.pdf", level="balanced")

Both levels strip pure attack vectors (/Launch, /GoToR, document JavaScript, dangerous URI schemes, etc.). balanced additionally preserves /SubmitForm / /ResetForm / form JS actions, annotation /AA and /JS triggers, the AcroForm /CO calculation order, and embedded files (used by PDF portfolios). Default is strict.

# Clean a single file (strict by default)
pdf-defang clean uploaded.pdf

# Clean many at once
pdf-defang clean *.pdf

# Keep form interactivity working
pdf-defang clean --level balanced internal_form.pdf

# Inspect without changes
pdf-defang scan suspicious.pdf

# Get JSON output for piping into your logging stack
pdf-defang scan suspicious.pdf --json | jq .risk_level
pdf-defang clean *.pdf --json > sanitization-log.json

Exit codes follow shell conventions:

from pdf_defang import sanitize

def handle_upload(uploaded_file_path: str) -> str:
    report = sanitize(uploaded_file_path, return_report=True)
    if report.error:
        raise ValueError(f"Could not process PDF: {report.error}")
    # Log what was removed for your audit trail
    logger.info("Sanitized %s: %s", uploaded_file_path, report.as_dict())
    return uploaded_file_path  # safe to serve back to other users now

from pdf_defang import scan

report = scan("phishing_attachment.pdf")
if report.risk_level == "high":
    quarantine(report)
elif report.risk_level == "medium":
    notify_security_team(report)

find /var/incoming -name '*.pdf' | xargs pdf-defang clean --json >> audit.jsonl

Sanitization is non-destructive to visible content:

• All text, images and layout
• Standard form fields (filled values stay intact)
• Bookmarks, table of contents, page labels
• Document metadata (Author, Title, Subject, Keywords)
• Standard link annotations to mailto: / http(s): URLs
• Document structure, page count, page order

pdf-defang is for the case where you want a small, free, drop-in function to ship in your existing Python app. No subprocesses, no Docker, no per-seat license.

Measured on a Windows 11 laptop, Python 3.13, on the fixture PDFs:

These are 50-100 times faster than container-based tools like Dangerzone (which take seconds-to-minutes per file).

To benchmark on your hardware:

python -m pytest tests/test_performance.py -v -s

• Sanitization modifies the input file in place. If you need the original preserved for audit, copy it first.
• Encrypted PDFs require the password= argument. Wrong-password attempts return an error report (not an exception).
• Malformed PDFs may not open at all - we surface the underlying pikepdf error in the report. The original file is not touched on failure.
• This is defense in depth, not a replacement for layered controls. Don't rely on a sanitizer alone for high-risk attachment workflows: also validate uploaders, sandbox processing, and scan with AV.

This library was originally written for kovetz.co.il (Hebrew PDF tools, www.kovetz.co.il) in May 2026, during an APT scanning campaign by an Iranian-attributed threat actor sweeping endpoints for upload vectors. We needed to make sure that any PDF leaving our service was free of executable payloads, even if an attacker successfully uploaded a poisoned file.

We initially wrote 67 lines of pikepdf code, tested it on the kovetz.co.il fleet (thousands of files/day), then realised there's no clean equivalent in the OSS Python ecosystem. So we extracted it here for everyone else who needs the same thing.

Issues and PRs welcome at github.com/kovetz-PDF/pdf-defang.

If you've found a PDF in the wild that contains active content we don't strip, please open an issue with the file (or a minimal reproducer) attached.

git clone https://github.com/kovetz-PDF/pdf-defang.git
cd pdf-defang
python -m pip install -e ".[test]"
python -m pytest

The tests/conftest.py will auto-generate the test fixture PDFs on first run.

MIT - free for any use, including commercial.

Built and maintained by kovetz.co.il. Contact: contact@kovetz.co.il