Find security vulnerabilities in your AI agent code before they reach production.
AI agents are not just chatbots. They execute code, call tools, and touch real systems, so one unsafe input path can become a production incident.
- Prompt injection rewrites agent intent through user-controlled context
- Unsafe tool inputs can reach
subprocess/evaland become command execution - MCP configuration mistakes can leak credentials and expand access unintentionally
If your team ships agent features, owns CI security gates, or operates MCP servers and tool integrations, this is a high-probability risk surface rather than an edge case. You likely need this before every merge if agent code can trigger tools, commands, or external systems.
Agent Audit catches these issues before deployment with an analysis core designed for agent workflows today: tool-boundary taint tracking, MCP configuration auditing, and semantic secret detection, with room to extend into learning-assisted detection over time.
Think of it as security linting for AI agents, with 60+ rules mapped to the OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026). Includes a dedicated DeFi Agent Security profile for blockchain interactions.
- Install
pip install agent-audit- Scan your project
agent-audit scan ./your-agent-project- Interpret and gate in CI
# Show only high+ findings
agent-audit scan . --severity high
# Fail CI when high+ findings exist
agent-audit scan . --fail-on high--severity controls what is reported. --fail-on controls when the command exits with code 1.
Sample report output:
╭──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╮
│ Agent Audit Security Report │
│ Scanned: ./your-agent-project │
│ Files analyzed: 2 │
│ Risk Score: 8.4/10 (HIGH) │
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
BLOCK -- Tier 1 (Confidence >= 90%) -- 16 findings
AGENT-001: Command Injection via Unsanitized Input
Location: agent.py:21
Code: result = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
AGENT-010: System Prompt Injection Vector in User Input Path
Location: agent.py:13
Code: system_prompt = f"You are a helpful {user_role} assistant..."
AGENT-041: SQL Injection via String Interpolation
Location: agent.py:31
Code: cursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '{query}'")
AGENT-031: Mcp Sensitive Env Exposure
Location: mcp_config.json:1
Code: env: {"API_KEY": "sk-a***"}
... and 15 more
Summary:
BLOCK: 16 | WARN: 2 | INFO: 1
Risk Score: =========================----- 8.4/10 (HIGH)
| Category | What goes wrong | Example rule |
|---|---|---|
| Injection attacks | User input flows to exec(), subprocess, SQL |
AGENT-001, AGENT-041 |
| Prompt injection | User input concatenated into system prompts | AGENT-010 |
| Leaked secrets | API keys hardcoded in source or MCP config | AGENT-004, AGENT-031 |
| Missing input validation | @tool functions accept raw strings without checks |
AGENT-034 |
| Unsafe MCP servers | No auth, no version pinning, overly broad permissions | AGENT-005, AGENT-029, AGENT-030, AGENT-033 |
| No guardrails | Agent runs without iteration limits or human approval | AGENT-028, AGENT-037 |
| Unrestricted code execution | Tools run eval() or shell=True without sandboxing |
AGENT-035 |
Full coverage of all 10 OWASP Agentic Security categories. See all rules ->
- Agent developers building with LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, OpenAI Agents SDK, or raw function-calling -- run it before every deploy
- Security engineers reviewing agent codebases -- get a structured report in SARIF for GitHub Security tab
- Teams shipping MCP servers -- validate your
mcp.json/claude_desktop_config.jsonfor secrets, auth gaps, and supply chain risks
# Scan a project
agent-audit scan ./my-agent
# JSON output for scripting
agent-audit scan ./my-agent --format json
# SARIF output for GitHub Code Scanning
agent-audit scan . --format sarif --output results.sarif
# Only fail CI on critical findings
agent-audit scan . --fail-on critical
# Inspect a live MCP server (read-only, never calls tools)
agent-audit inspect stdio -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmpAgent Audit includes specialized detection rules for AI Agent x DeFi/Blockchain interactions. These rules cover vulnerabilities unique to agents that interact with on-chain protocols:
- Transaction signing without validation -- agent tool calls that sign and submit transactions without verifying amounts, recipients, or gas parameters
- Overprivileged DeFi tool definitions -- agent tools with unnecessarily broad access to wallet operations
- Credential leakage in agent configs -- private keys, API secrets, or wallet mnemonics exposed in agent orchestration code
- Gas limit governance -- on-chain transactions submitted without explicit gas limits, vulnerable to manipulation
- Weak randomness in settlement code -- use of non-cryptographic random number generators in transaction flows
- Oracle manipulation vectors -- agent pipelines that consume price oracle data without staleness or deviation checks
# Standard agent security scan
agent-audit scan .
# DeFi-specific agent security scan (includes all standard rules + DeFi rules)
agent-audit scan . --profile defiThe DeFi profile adds 20 additional detection rules (AGENT-090 through AGENT-109) mapped to the OWASP Agentic Security Index, specifically targeting the agent-to-chain interaction boundary that traditional SAST tools (Semgrep, Bandit) cannot detect.
Track only new findings across commits:
# Save current state as baseline
agent-audit scan . --save-baseline baseline.json
# Only report new findings not in baseline
agent-audit scan . --baseline baseline.json --fail-on-newname: Security Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
agent-audit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Run Agent Audit
uses: HeadyZhang/agent-audit@v1
with:
path: '.'
fail-on: 'high'
upload-sarif: 'true'| Input | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|
path |
Path to scan | . |
format |
Output format: terminal, json, sarif, markdown |
sarif |
severity |
Minimum severity to report | low |
fail-on |
Exit with error at this severity | high |
baseline |
Baseline file for incremental scanning | - |
upload-sarif |
Upload SARIF to GitHub Security tab | true |
Create .agent-audit.yaml in your project root:
# Ignore specific rules for certain paths
ignore:
- rule_id: AGENT-003
paths:
- "auth/**"
reason: "Auth module legitimately communicates externally"
# Scan settings
scan:
exclude:
- "tests/**"
- "venv/**"
min_severity: low
fail_on: high| Rule ID | Title | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| AGENT-001 | Command Injection via Unsanitized Input | Critical |
| AGENT-002 | Excessive Agent Permissions | Medium |
| AGENT-003 | Potential Data Exfiltration Chain | High |
| AGENT-004 | Hardcoded Credentials | Critical |
| AGENT-005 | Unverified MCP Server | High |
| AGENT-010 | System Prompt Injection | Critical |
| AGENT-022 | No Error Handling in Tool Execution | High |
| AGENT-026 | Tool Input Not Sanitized | Critical |
| AGENT-028 | Agent Without Iteration Limit | High |
| AGENT-029 | Overly Broad MCP Filesystem Access | High |
| AGENT-030 | Unpinned MCP Server Package | Critical |
| AGENT-031 | Hardcoded Secrets in MCP Config | High |
| AGENT-032 | MCP Server Without Sandbox | Medium |
| AGENT-033 | MCP Server Without Authentication | High |
| AGENT-034 | Tool Function Without Input Validation | High |
| AGENT-035 | Unrestricted Code Execution in Tool | Critical |
| AGENT-037 | Missing Human-in-the-Loop | High |
| AGENT-040 | Insecure MCP Tool Schema | Medium |
| AGENT-041 | SQL Injection via String Interpolation | Critical |
| AGENT-042 | Excessive MCP Servers | Medium |
| AGENT-050 | AgentExecutor Without Safety Parameters | High |
Agent Audit combines three analysis engines:
- Python AST Scanner -- walks the abstract syntax tree to trace data flow from
@toolparameters to dangerous sinks (subprocess,eval,cursor.execute), with intra-procedural taint tracking and sanitization detection - MCP Config Scanner -- parses
mcp.json/claude_desktop_config.json/ YAML configs to check filesystem permissions, supply chain integrity, credential exposure, and auth gaps - Secret Detector -- pattern-matches hardcoded API keys (AWS, OpenAI, Anthropic, GitHub, etc.) with framework-aware suppression to reduce false positives from Pydantic schema definitions
For technical details on detection methodology and benchmark results, see ARCHITECTURE.md.
git clone https://github.com/HeadyZhang/agent-audit
cd agent-audit/packages/audit
poetry install
poetry run pytest tests/ -v
poetry run agent-audit scan .See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.
MIT License - see LICENSE for details.
- Based on the OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026)
- Inspired by the need for better AI agent security tooling