Skip to content

Navigation Menu

Sign in
Appearance settings

Search code, repositories, users, issues, pull requests...

Provide feedback

We read every piece of feedback, and take your input very seriously.

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Appearance settings

Latest commit

 

History

History
History

Folders and files

NameName
Last commit message
Last commit date

parent directory

..
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

README.md

Outline

Agent Audit

Find security vulnerabilities in your AI agent code before they reach production.

PyPI version Python License: MIT CI codecov


Why Agent Security Fails in Production

AI agents are not just chatbots. They execute code, call tools, and touch real systems, so one unsafe input path can become a production incident.

  • Prompt injection rewrites agent intent through user-controlled context
  • Unsafe tool inputs can reach subprocess/eval and become command execution
  • MCP configuration mistakes can leak credentials and expand access unintentionally

If your team ships agent features, owns CI security gates, or operates MCP servers and tool integrations, this is a high-probability risk surface rather than an edge case. You likely need this before every merge if agent code can trigger tools, commands, or external systems.

Agent Audit catches these issues before deployment with an analysis core designed for agent workflows today: tool-boundary taint tracking, MCP configuration auditing, and semantic secret detection, with room to extend into learning-assisted detection over time.

Think of it as security linting for AI agents, with 60+ rules mapped to the OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026). Includes a dedicated DeFi Agent Security profile for blockchain interactions.


Quick Start in 6 Lines

  1. Install
pip install agent-audit
  1. Scan your project
agent-audit scan ./your-agent-project
  1. Interpret and gate in CI
# Show only high+ findings
agent-audit scan . --severity high

# Fail CI when high+ findings exist
agent-audit scan . --fail-on high

--severity controls what is reported. --fail-on controls when the command exits with code 1.

Sample report output:

╭──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╮
│ Agent Audit Security Report                                                  │
│ Scanned: ./your-agent-project                                                │
│ Files analyzed: 2                                                            │
│ Risk Score: 8.4/10 (HIGH)                                                    │
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯

BLOCK -- Tier 1 (Confidence >= 90%) -- 16 findings

  AGENT-001: Command Injection via Unsanitized Input
    Location: agent.py:21
    Code: result = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)

  AGENT-010: System Prompt Injection Vector in User Input Path
    Location: agent.py:13
    Code: system_prompt = f"You are a helpful {user_role} assistant..."

  AGENT-041: SQL Injection via String Interpolation
    Location: agent.py:31
    Code: cursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '{query}'")

  AGENT-031: Mcp Sensitive Env Exposure
    Location: mcp_config.json:1
    Code: env: {"API_KEY": "sk-a***"}

  ... and 15 more

Summary:
  BLOCK: 16 | WARN: 2 | INFO: 1
  Risk Score: =========================----- 8.4/10 (HIGH)

What It Detects

Category What goes wrong Example rule
Injection attacks User input flows to exec(), subprocess, SQL AGENT-001, AGENT-041
Prompt injection User input concatenated into system prompts AGENT-010
Leaked secrets API keys hardcoded in source or MCP config AGENT-004, AGENT-031
Missing input validation @tool functions accept raw strings without checks AGENT-034
Unsafe MCP servers No auth, no version pinning, overly broad permissions AGENT-005, AGENT-029, AGENT-030, AGENT-033
No guardrails Agent runs without iteration limits or human approval AGENT-028, AGENT-037
Unrestricted code execution Tools run eval() or shell=True without sandboxing AGENT-035

Full coverage of all 10 OWASP Agentic Security categories. See all rules ->


Who Is This For

  • Agent developers building with LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, OpenAI Agents SDK, or raw function-calling -- run it before every deploy
  • Security engineers reviewing agent codebases -- get a structured report in SARIF for GitHub Security tab
  • Teams shipping MCP servers -- validate your mcp.json / claude_desktop_config.json for secrets, auth gaps, and supply chain risks

Usage

# Scan a project
agent-audit scan ./my-agent

# JSON output for scripting
agent-audit scan ./my-agent --format json

# SARIF output for GitHub Code Scanning
agent-audit scan . --format sarif --output results.sarif

# Only fail CI on critical findings
agent-audit scan . --fail-on critical

# Inspect a live MCP server (read-only, never calls tools)
agent-audit inspect stdio -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp

DeFi Agent Security Scanning

Agent Audit includes specialized detection rules for AI Agent x DeFi/Blockchain interactions. These rules cover vulnerabilities unique to agents that interact with on-chain protocols:

  • Transaction signing without validation -- agent tool calls that sign and submit transactions without verifying amounts, recipients, or gas parameters
  • Overprivileged DeFi tool definitions -- agent tools with unnecessarily broad access to wallet operations
  • Credential leakage in agent configs -- private keys, API secrets, or wallet mnemonics exposed in agent orchestration code
  • Gas limit governance -- on-chain transactions submitted without explicit gas limits, vulnerable to manipulation
  • Weak randomness in settlement code -- use of non-cryptographic random number generators in transaction flows
  • Oracle manipulation vectors -- agent pipelines that consume price oracle data without staleness or deviation checks
# Standard agent security scan
agent-audit scan .

# DeFi-specific agent security scan (includes all standard rules + DeFi rules)
agent-audit scan . --profile defi

The DeFi profile adds 20 additional detection rules (AGENT-090 through AGENT-109) mapped to the OWASP Agentic Security Index, specifically targeting the agent-to-chain interaction boundary that traditional SAST tools (Semgrep, Bandit) cannot detect.

Baseline Scanning

Track only new findings across commits:

# Save current state as baseline
agent-audit scan . --save-baseline baseline.json

# Only report new findings not in baseline
agent-audit scan . --baseline baseline.json --fail-on-new

GitHub Action

name: Security Scan
on: [push, pull_request]

jobs:
  agent-audit:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Run Agent Audit
        uses: HeadyZhang/agent-audit@v1
        with:
          path: '.'
          fail-on: 'high'
          upload-sarif: 'true'
Input Description Default
path Path to scan .
format Output format: terminal, json, sarif, markdown sarif
severity Minimum severity to report low
fail-on Exit with error at this severity high
baseline Baseline file for incremental scanning -
upload-sarif Upload SARIF to GitHub Security tab true

Configuration

Create .agent-audit.yaml in your project root:

# Ignore specific rules for certain paths
ignore:
  - rule_id: AGENT-003
    paths:
      - "auth/**"
    reason: "Auth module legitimately communicates externally"

# Scan settings
scan:
  exclude:
    - "tests/**"
    - "venv/**"
  min_severity: low
  fail_on: high

Detected Rules

Rule ID Title Severity
AGENT-001 Command Injection via Unsanitized Input Critical
AGENT-002 Excessive Agent Permissions Medium
AGENT-003 Potential Data Exfiltration Chain High
AGENT-004 Hardcoded Credentials Critical
AGENT-005 Unverified MCP Server High
AGENT-010 System Prompt Injection Critical
AGENT-022 No Error Handling in Tool Execution High
AGENT-026 Tool Input Not Sanitized Critical
AGENT-028 Agent Without Iteration Limit High
AGENT-029 Overly Broad MCP Filesystem Access High
AGENT-030 Unpinned MCP Server Package Critical
AGENT-031 Hardcoded Secrets in MCP Config High
AGENT-032 MCP Server Without Sandbox Medium
AGENT-033 MCP Server Without Authentication High
AGENT-034 Tool Function Without Input Validation High
AGENT-035 Unrestricted Code Execution in Tool Critical
AGENT-037 Missing Human-in-the-Loop High
AGENT-040 Insecure MCP Tool Schema Medium
AGENT-041 SQL Injection via String Interpolation Critical
AGENT-042 Excessive MCP Servers Medium
AGENT-050 AgentExecutor Without Safety Parameters High

How It Works

Agent Audit combines three analysis engines:

  1. Python AST Scanner -- walks the abstract syntax tree to trace data flow from @tool parameters to dangerous sinks (subprocess, eval, cursor.execute), with intra-procedural taint tracking and sanitization detection
  2. MCP Config Scanner -- parses mcp.json / claude_desktop_config.json / YAML configs to check filesystem permissions, supply chain integrity, credential exposure, and auth gaps
  3. Secret Detector -- pattern-matches hardcoded API keys (AWS, OpenAI, Anthropic, GitHub, etc.) with framework-aware suppression to reduce false positives from Pydantic schema definitions

For technical details on detection methodology and benchmark results, see ARCHITECTURE.md.


Development

git clone https://github.com/HeadyZhang/agent-audit
cd agent-audit/packages/audit
poetry install
poetry run pytest tests/ -v
poetry run agent-audit scan .

See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.


License

MIT License - see LICENSE for details.

Acknowledgments

Morty Proxy This is a proxified and sanitized view of the page, visit original site.