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Security: 01rabbit/Azazel-Edge

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Azazel-Edge (AZ-01, codename SENTINEL) is a deception/delay gateway that faces hostile traffic by design — scapegoat surfaces exist to be probed, bound, and slowed by attackers. The boundary that matters is not those surfaces; it is the line between them and the protected segment / control plane (deterministic arbiter, nftables/tc policy, audit chain, management interfaces).

Reporting a vulnerability

Report privately via GitHub Security Advisories: https://github.com/01rabbit/Azazel-Edge/security/advisories/new

Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.

Include: affected version or commit hash; deployment profile (e.g. field/vehicle/humanitarian, enabled feature flags); reproduction steps or a minimal PoC; observed impact and, if known, the affected component.

No bounty program. Reporters are credited in the advisory unless anonymity is requested.

Response targets

  • Acknowledgement: within 7 days
  • Initial assessment (severity, affected versions): within 14 days
  • Fix and disclosure are coordinated with the reporter.

Scope

In scope — anything that crosses the boundary described above:

  • Authentication/authorization bypass on the web UI or API (token, mTLS, RBAC role checks)
  • Escape from a scapegoat/deception surface — or from the captive portal / portal-viewer — into the protected segment or control plane
  • Bypass of nftables/tc policy enforcement
  • Audit hash-chain integrity break
  • Privilege escalation via the installer or systemd unit files
  • Secrets leakage (tokens, certificate/key material) through any endpoint, including the EPD web preview
  • Manipulation of the deterministic arbiter's decisions via crafted sensor input, where it crosses a documented security boundary
  • AI-assist (local Ollama) prompt-injection paths that cross an authority boundary — AI is assist-only; anything letting it trigger or execute an unapproved action is in scope

Out of scope:

  • Attacker interaction with deception surfaces — binding, slowing, or observing attackers there is the product working as intended
  • Degraded throughput on delaying paths
  • Findings that require pre-existing root on the appliance

Supported versions

Latest tagged release and main.

There aren't any published security advisories

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