Lewisham rail crash
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| Date and time | 4 December 1957 |
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| Location | near St Johns |
| Rail line | Lewisham by-pass line (BR Southern Region) |
| Cause | SPAD |
| Trains | 2 |
| Passengers | 2200[1] |
| Deaths | 90 |
| Injuries | 173 |
| List of UK rail accidents by year List of UK rail accidents by death toll |
The Lewisham rail crash on the British railway system occurred on 4 December 1957 just outside St Johns railway station in Lewisham, south London. Ninety people were killed and 173 injured, making it the third worst rail crash in the UK in terms of deaths.
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[edit] The crash
The accident occurred during cold and very foggy conditions that were causing severe disruption to train services in the London area. The fog is thought to have been especially dense in the cutting between New Cross and St Johns, with the driver of the 5.18pm electric train from Charing Cross to Hayes reporting that visibility was reduced to 20 yards or less in some places. Due to uncertainty of the signaller in Parks Bridge junction signal box as to the destination of this train[2], it was held at a signal soon after St Johns station and stopped with its last carriage under the flyover carrying the Lewisham to Nunhead line.
A few minutes later, at 6.20pm, it was hit from behind by the delayed 4.56pm steam train from Cannon Street to Ramsgate, hauled by Bulleid Pacific 34066 ‘Spitfire’. The ninth and eighth coaches of the ten-coach Hayes train were telescoped together, with the ninth riding up over the underframe of the eighth and destroying its body completely. Behind, the tender and first coach of the steam train were derailed and struck one of the supports of the Lewisham-Nunhead flyover. This buckled immediately and collapsed onto the first three coaches, crushing two of them almost flat.
The driver, W.J. Trew, had failed to see two yellow ‘caution’ signals between New Cross and St Johns. Signal sighting was especially difficult for steam train drivers, since the boiler and sometimes drifting exhaust ahead of the cab gave him a limited field of vision and the signals on this stretch of line were mounted on the right, whereas most steam locomotives by that time were left-hand drive. Drivers of steam trains that had passed the site in the hour before the accident had got their firemen to lean out on the right and see signals, but Trew did not ask fireman C.D. Hoare to do so. It was never established why, nor is it known exactly what he saw or, if he was aware that he should have seen signals, why he did not slow.
Hoare did lean out as the train entered St Johns and saw the red signal at the far end of the platform, and Trew made an emergency brake application, but it was too late. The 400-long-ton (410 t) train was travelling too fast to stop and crashed into the back of the Hayes train at about 35 miles per hour (56 km/h).
Further disaster was narrowly averted when the driver of a train about to cross the flyover noticed that it had buckled and managed to stop short. The first coach of this train was tilted over at an angle, but did not fall onto the wreckage below and was evacuated quickly and hauled to safety. Rescue work went on throughout the evening, and it was difficult and dangerous for the emergency services to reach passengers trapped in the crushed coaches under the flyover. All survivors had been extracted and despatched to hospital before midnight.
[edit] Consequences
The accident was blamed solely on Driver Trew. He was tried for manslaughter in May 1958 but the jury could not agree on a verdict. A second trial was convened, but by then it was realised that his mental health had been impaired severely by the accident and its aftermath. No evidence was offered against him and he was discharged. Despite the verdict of the official enquiry it was widely believed that, although Trew had made some critical errors, some of the blame lay with British Railways, which had made slow progress with the development and installation of the Automatic Warning System (AWS), which would almost certainly have prevented the accident. British Railways had been criticised for its slowness in introducing the system after the earlier accident at Harrow, and after the Lewisham disaster work on AWS was speeded up. It was not, however, made mandatory until after the Southall crash in 1997, some 40 years later.
Mr Chadwick, a member of the public who had assisted at the accident, successfully sued the British Railways Board for the "nervous shock" he experienced (PTSD in modern terms). The case, Chadwick v British Railways Board, remains an important precedent in this area of the law.
The collapsed flyover was replaced by a temporary structure of military trestling. This structure proved to be very strong and durable, and is still in use.
A plaque at Lewisham railway station commemorates the accident.
[edit] Similar accidents
[edit] References
- Hamilton., J.A.B. (1967). British Railway Accidents of the 20th Century (reprinted as Disaster down the Line).. George Allen and Unwin / Javelin Books. ISBN 978-0-7137-1973-4.
- Nock, O.S. (1980). Historic Railway Disasters (2nd ed. ed.). Ian Allan.
- Rolt, L.T.C. (1956 (and later editions)). Red for Danger. Bodley Head / David and Charles / Pan Books.
- Vaughan, Adrian (1989). Obstruction Danger. Guild Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85260-055-6.
- Tatlow, Peter (2007). Lewisham St John's Fifty Years on: Restoring the Traffic. Oakwood Press.
- Robert C Turner (1990) Black Clouds and White Feathers Chapter 8 Five Miles and 4 Seconds to Disaster Oxford Publishing Co ISBN 0-86093-457-8
[edit] External links
[edit] References
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Coordinates: 51°28′03.3″N 0°01′09.3″W / 51.467583°N 0.01925°W
