What a lovely hat

Is it made out of tin foil?

Paper 2026/805

Compact Verifiable Shuffles for ElGamal Ciphertexts

Yuxi Xue, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Xingye Lu, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Man Ho Au, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Abstract

A verifiable shuffle proves that output ciphertexts are a rerandomized permutation of the inputs without revealing the permutation or rerandomization factors. It is a core primitive in mix-nets for electronic voting and blockchain-based anonymization, where each mix server publishes an auditable proof. Existing deployed schemes typically have proof size $O(N)$ or $O(\sqrt{N})$ in the number of ciphertexts $N$, making shuffle proofs a major bandwidth cost. We present a logarithmic-size verifiable shuffle for ElGamal ciphertexts. The logarithmic term in our proof size is one third of that in the previously known logarithmic construction for the same shuffle relation by Hoffmann et al. (CCS 2019). Our protocol is public coin, non-interactive via the Fiat--Shamir transform, and relies on an updatable structured reference string that can be generated once in a powers-of-tau ceremony and reused across applications. We implement the protocol in Rust and provide, to our knowledge, the first benchmarks for a logarithmic-size ElGamal shuffle. At \(N=2^{20}\), the proof is 2.6 KiB. In a four-server mix-net election, the four shuffle proofs occupy approximately 10.6 KiB in total, excluding ballot-validity and decryption proofs.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Verifiable shufflesZero-knowledge proofsE-voting
Contact author(s)
yuxi-ivy xue @ connect polyu hk
xing-ye lu @ polyu edu hk
mhaau @ polyu edu hk
History
2026-08-04: revised
2026-04-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/805
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/805,
      author = {Yuxi Xue and Xingye Lu and Man Ho Au},
      title = {Compact Verifiable Shuffles for {ElGamal} Ciphertexts},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/805},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/805}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.
Morty Proxy This is a proxified and sanitized view of the page, visit original site.